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THE DEFENCE OF NECESSITY AND ADDRESSING CLIMATE 




There are times when we must disobey the law.  If we are lucky, we may 
live our entire lives without being confronted by such a time.  I don’t be-
lieve that, for most people, respect for the law derives from the threat of 
punishment, even severe punishment.  People respect and honour the law 
because they trust and have confidence in its process.  At its best, we have 
confidence that the law has an extraordinary integrity and capacity to ad-
dress the most complex and vexing conflicts—ones that often threaten the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
I have been convicted of criminal contempt of court for acting to 
halt the construction of the Trans Mountain Pipeline expansion.  I am not 
alone; about 240 other people were arrested last year in British Columbia 
for steps they took to oppose that project.  On December 3, 2018, in a joint 
application with my co-accused, Jennifer Nathan, we sought leave to raise 
the common law defence of necessity at our trial, and for permission to 
call expert evidence at trial about climate change and the emissions impli-
cations of continuing to expand Canada’s oil sands industry.  After a two-
day hearing, the presiding judge, Justice Affleck, dismissed our applica-
tion.  We were convicted at a further hearing on March 11, 2019.  We have 
launched an appeal of that decision to the Court of Appeal for British Co-
lumbia.1 
One of the unusual features of this application is that we were not 
permitted to call any actual evidence (i.e., sworn affidavits or oral testi-
mony from leading climate scientists and energy economists).  We were 
only allowed to provide the court with an “outline”2 or written summary 
of the evidence we proposed to call.  Our application, presented to the 
court on December 3–4, 2018, was therefore a preliminary application to 
obtain the court’s “leave” or permission to call the needed scientific evi-
dence at our trial.  
I offer below some comments on the proposed evidence we have 
presented to the B.C. court in this case.  We show the failures of Canada’s 
environmental review process for the Trans Mountain project.  The pro-
cess refused to address whether the planned expansion of oil sands pro-
duction to 2040 could be consistent with Canada’s commitments under the 
Paris Agreement to keep the increase in global warming to within the 
1.5°C or 2°C limits.  
My working life was as a lawyer in civil litigation for 35 years.  I 
retired from practice at the end of 2012.  The benefit of that background 
allowed me to see the enormous promise that the judicial process offers, if 
it can be engaged, to bring this troubling evidence to an open public hear-
ing.  In our government, nobody wants to talk about the rapid pace of the 
 
1.  Her Majesty the Queen v. David Anthony Gooderham and Jennifer 
Nathan (Can. B.C. Court of Appeal, Nos. CA45950 & 45953). The Notice of Appeal 
was filed March 11, 2019. Appellants’ factum was filed on November 18, 2020. The 
hearing is set for May 26, 2020. 











advancing climate peril.  But to reveal the full gravity of our problem, there 
is no better forum than the courts because people have to tell the truth.  
 
II. CANADA’S EMISSIONS SITUATION3 
 
In terms of its annual emissions, Canada is about one-ninth the 
size of the United States––716 million tonnes (Mt) in 2017 compared to 
6.4 billion tonnes, or roughly equivalent to one of the largest emitting 
American states (i.e., California or Texas).  Canada accounts for 1.6% of 
annual global emissions—but is the world’s tenth largest emitter.  
Proponents of oil sands expansion often say that Canada’s share 
of global emissions is so small that anything we do is of no consequence.  
Let us pause to consider the “smallness of Canada.”  The point is that no 
player is “small” in our current predicament.  There are four big emitters: 
China, the United States, Europe, and India.  They account for about 60% 
of annual global emissions.  The world needs to achieve absolute reduction 
in the range of 25% to 50% below current levels within the next 11 years 
to stay within 1.5 or 2°C.  That requires all countries worldwide on aver-
age to reduce their emissions by 25% to 50%.  But the evidence is clear 
that two of the world’s largest emitters, China and India, and also many of 
the poorest countries, will achieve no absolute reductions at all below 
their current levels before 2030. 
So, there is no realistic hope of mitigating the impending dire out-
come unless Canada and other wealthy, technologically advanced mid-
size economies achieve their own deep cuts over the next eleven years.  
The dilemma for Canada is that it has a disproportionately large oil and 
gas sector.  Oil and gas is Canada’s largest emitting sector (26% of our 
annual total)—whereas, in the United States and in most other advanced 
economies, the largest emitting sector is transportation.  Canada’s oil and 
 
3.  See, e.g., Env’t & Climate Change Can., National Inventory Report 
1990–2016: Greenhouse Gas Sources and Sinks in Canada, U.N. FRAMEWORK CON-
VENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Apr. 13, 2018), https://unfccc.int/documents/65715; 
Env’t & Climate Change Can., Canada’s 7th National Communication and 3rd Bien-
nial Report, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Dec. 29, 2017), 
https://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/national_communications_and_biennial_re-
ports/application/pdf/82051493_canada-nc7-br3-1-5108_eccc_can7thncomm3rdbi-
report_en_04_web.pdf; Env’t & Climate Change Can., Review of Related Upstream 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates, IMPACT ASSESSMENT AGENCY OF CAN. (Nov. 
25, 2016), https://iaac-aeic.gc.ca/050/documents/p80061/116524E.pdf; Alberta, Cli-












gas sector is projected to show no decline in total emissions by 2030, be-
low the present level (yes, some producers will achieve credible reductions 
in emissions per barrel, but the number of barrels is rising).  The expansion 
of the oil sands accounts for virtually all of the growth in Canada’s oil and 
gas sector emissions between 2005 and 2030.  
Because of geography and the economics of transporting bitumen, 
the projected expansion of oil sands production to 2030 and 2040 depends 
on new pipeline capacity.  It depends critically on two proposed new pipe-
lines in Canada—Trans Mountain and a second new project, Line 3.  The 
proponents of further expansion also hope to see the early completion of 
Keystone XL.  That dependency on new pipelines is all the more acute 
because the costs of production per barrel in Alberta are comparatively 
high—and using rail adds about $10 per barrel more.  
Canada is not on track to meet its reduction commitments by 2030 
under the Paris Agreement, which promises a 30% cut below the 2005 
level.  Canada’s total emissions by 2020 are projected to be only about 2% 
less than in 2005.  In April 2019, the Government of Canada published its 
most recent emissions data to 2017.  The numbers show that in the period 
from 2005 to 2017, Canada achieved a creditable 45 Mt reduction of an-
nual emissions in our electricity sector (by far the largest source of emis-
sions reductions in the country).  But over the same period, from 2005 to 
2017, the annual level of emission from the oil sands extraction increased 
by 45 Mt—entirely cancelling out all gains from the transformation of 
Canada’s electricity sector.  
In our case, we are relying on the common law defence of neces-
sity, which holds that in a situation where there is "a clear and imminent 
peril," conduct disobeying the law undertaken by a citizen to avoid the 
peril may be excused from criminal liability.4 
At this preliminary application for leave to raise the necessity de-
fence, we were not obliged to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that 
there exists an “imminent peril.”  The test we had to meet, in order to be 
allowed to call the required evidence, was simply to demonstrate (based 
on the material in our Outline of Proposed Evidence) that there is an air of 
reality (a legal expression)5 to our belief that advancing climate change is 
an imminent peril within the meaning of the law, and that our belief is 
reasonable, based on the available objective evidence (set out in our sum-
mary of expert evidence of climate scientists and energy economists). 
 
4.  Regina v. Latimer, 2001 SCC 1, at ¶ 29 (quoting Morgentaler v. The 
Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616, at p. 678); see Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 
232. 










That test, an air of reality, is a relatively low threshold of 
proof.  To meet that test, the judge needed only to be satisfied that our case 
about the impending threat of advancing climate change is not fanciful, 
and that if the proposed scientific evidence set out in the Outline were to 
be actually heard at trial—and assuming it is accepted as credible by the 
trial judge—the trial judge could decide, based on that evidence, that our 
belief we are facing an “imminent peril” is reasonable. 
  
III.   GLOBAL CONTEXT: PROPOSED EVIDENCE  
 
The Outline shows that even if all countries in the world (includ-
ing Canada) were to fully implement all the commitments they have al-
ready made under the Paris Agreement to reduce their own national emis-
sions by 2030 (referred to as their Nationally Determined Contributions or 
“NDCs”), the surface of the earth by 2030 will still be irrevocably com-
mitted to warming that will far exceed the promised 2°C threshold.  The 
UN Emissions Gap Report 2017, cited in the Outline, explains the im-
portance of the next twelve years: 
 
Looking beyond 2030, it is clear that if the emissions gap 
is not closed by 2030, it is extremely unlikely that the goal 
of keeping warming to well below 2°C can still be 
reached.  Even if the current NDCs are fully implemented, 
the carbon budget for limiting global warming to below 
2°C will be about 80% depleted by 2030.  Given currently 
available carbon budget estimates, the available carbon 
budget for 1.5°C warming will already be well depleted 
by 2030.6 
 
The emissions “gap” is the difference between the currently projected 
level of global emissions in 2030 (assuming that all existing NDCs are 
fully implemented) and the much lower level of global emissions required 
to keep warming “well below 2°C.”  The UN report concludes that, at pre-
sent, we are on a path to more than 3°C warming. 
To stay below 2°C, the annual level of global emissions must de-
cline from the currently projected 2030 level of 55.2 billion tonnes of 
CO2eq (GtCO2eq) down to an annual level of 41.8 GtCO2eq or less—a 
 
6.  Emissions Gap Report 2017, UN ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME ixv, 










reduction of 13.4 GtCO2eq—requiring cuts by all emitting countries av-
eraging 25% worldwide.  To stay below 1.5°C, the annual level of global 
emissions must decline by about 50% below current levels by 2030. 
There are no existing commitments by signatories to the Paris 
Agreement to make additional reductions to their national emissions, 
which might even partially close that gap.  In its Fifth Assessment Report, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded that the only 
pathways consistent with keeping warming below 2°C require emissions 
reductions on a global scale starting by 2020.7  We have presented the 
court with a summary of the most recent available evidence showing base-
line (“business-as-usual”) projections of future emissions growth, looking 
at the period to 2030.  The available evidence shows that even if all signa-
tories to the 2015 Paris Agreement fully implement all their promised 
NDCs, the level of global emissions is projected to rise 6% above the 2016 
level.  
Oil accounts for 34% of global CO2 emissions from burning fossil 
fuels.  Although emissions from coal burning (40% of the total) are begin-
ning to decline, coal demand increased by 1% in 2017.  Emissions from 
natural gas (19%) are increasing—and expected to continue to increase for 
at least another decade.  The “450 Scenario” published in the IEA’s World 
Energy Outlook 2015 is based on a 50-50 chance of keeping warming be-
low the 2°C threshold.8  It concludes that, to meet that goal, global oil 
consumption would have to start to decline by 2020. 
Notwithstanding the need to curb oil consumption starting in 2020 
to meet the 2°C limit, the Appellants’ Outline shows that global oil con-
sumption in all baseline studies is projected to continue increasing to 
2040.  The world’s six or seven major oil-producing countries, including 
Canada, are intent on continuing to expand oil production to 2040 and, in 
the case of Canada, are currently building new infrastructure to facilitate 
that expansion. 
The window of opportunity to close the emissions “gap” is brief 
and unforgiving.  Unprecedented cuts in the annual level of emissions 
would have to start on a global scale by 2020 and be repeated every year 
through the next decade.  In the absence of deep cuts in the annual level of 
 
7.  Fifth Assessment Report, IPCC, https://www.ipcc.ch/assessment-re-
port/ar5/ (2014); see also Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report, IPCC, https://ar5-
syr.ipcc.ch (2015). 











global emissions within that timeframe, by 2030 the atmospheric concen-
tration level will have exceeded 450 parts per million (“ppm”) CO2eq, 
which irrevocably commits us to warming above 2°C. 
That is the proposed evidence we presented to the court. 
The atmospheric carbon concentration reached 405 ppm in 2017.  
It is now rising 20 ppm per decade.  In recent years, the annual increase 
has been higher—rising 3.0 ppm in 2016.  
Further, the proposed evidence in our case shows that two of the 
world’s four largest emitting economies are projected to contribute rela-
tively little or nothing to future cuts to 2030.  China, the world’s largest 
emitter (28% of the global total), is expected to achieve no significant re-
duction in the annual level of its emissions before 2030.  India’s emissions 
(7% of the global total) will continue to grow to 2030.  India’s emissions 
are 1.8 tonnes of CO2 (tCO2) per person, compared to 16.6 tCO2 per person 
for the USA and 7.2t CO2 for China.  Very low per capita emissions reflect 
severe poverty, leaving poorer countries no margin to further reduce their 
total emissions.  Any deep reductions of global emissions (cuts in the order 
of 25% to 50% on a global average) will therefore have to come dispro-
portionately from a smaller number of technologically advanced countries.  
For that reason, emissions reductions in Canada are crucial.  
 
IV.   THE DECISION IN OUR CASE 
 
At the conclusion of our hearing on December 4, 2018, the pre-
siding judge rejected our application to call evidence on the emissions im-
plications of the Trans Mountain expansion.9  In his reasons for judgment, 
issued six weeks later, Justice Affleck found that there is a “contingency” 
that any dire climate outcome can still be avoided: 
 
On the evidence the applicants seek to offer, rising global 
temperatures, to a level that is catastrophic to life, is a pro-
cess that has been happening over many decades.  Despite 
a historical lack of initiative to curb emissions over these 
same decades, adaptive societal measures may be taken to 
prevent such a dire outcome.  Whether government, pri-
 
9.  Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC v. Mivisair, 2019 BCSC 50, at ¶ 55 










vate industry, and citizens take these measures is a con-
tingency that takes these consequences outside of “virtual 
certainty” and into the realm of “foreseeable or likely.”10  
 
Thus, the judge concluded that “a dire outcome” is not “virtually certain.” 
The substance of our case is that any increase in the earth’s aver-
age surface temperature that exceeds 1.5°C will be a dire outcome—bring-
ing devastating and irreversible impacts on human life and natural sys-
tems, impacts that are already far advanced.  The losses will be 
catastrophic as the warming of the earth approaches and exceeds 2°C.  Our 
proposed evidence shows that, at present, we are on a path to more than 
3°C.  The annual level of global emissions is still increasing.   
A contingency, if it is very slight (like the contingency we have of 
winning the lottery), cannot be material in deciding in this case that the 
climate peril can be avoided.  The judge made no finding about the degree 
of likelihood that the hoped-for contingency will occur.  The judge erred 
in drawing an inference, unsupported by evidentiary material, that such a 
“contingency” exists.  That is our submission on this appeal. 
 
V.  REVIEW PROCESSES 
 
The core question underlying this case is whether the planned ex-
pansion of Canada’s oil sands production to 2040 is compatible with our 
commitment under the Paris Agreement to limit the increase in global av-
erage temperature to “well below 2°C” and make our best efforts to limit 
the increase to 1.5°C.  We can measure the integrity and strength of our 
legal culture by examining how the approval process for the Trans Moun-
tain project dealt with that question.  
Three years ago, Canada authorized the construction of this pro-
ject.  The order that lies at the root of that decision is an Order in Council 
dated November 29, 2016.11  The Trans Mountain project—together with 
a second new project called Line 3—will provide 50% of the additional 
pipeline capacity needed to drive the continued growth of Canada’s oil 
sands production to 2040. 
The Order in Council stated that the Government of Canada was 
“satisfied” that this pipeline expansion project is “consistent with Can-
ada’s commitments in relation to the Paris Agreement on Climate 
 
10.  Id. (emphasis added). 











Change.”12  That is obviously a crucial statement.  The Order provided the 
ethical foundation, not just the legal foundation, for the pipeline approval 
decision.  In authorizing Trans Mountain, the Order cited three reports 
that, it declared, had furnished the evidence relied on by the cabinet to 
justify their decision.  
 
A. National Energy Board Inquiry Report (May 19, 2016) 
 
On May 19, 2016, the National Energy Board (“NEB”) issued a 
report recommending approval of the Trans Mountain project, following 
a lengthy inquiry through 2014 and 2015.13  It was a public hearing pro-
cess, and it had full powers to call evidence.  However, the NEB took the 
view that “upstream emissions” released into the atmosphere at oil sands 
production sites in Alberta did not fall within the scope of the inquiry.  The 
inquiry excluded all evidence about greenhouse gas emissions in Al-
berta—and excluded all scientific evidence about the impact of emissions 
on the climate system.  
Two years earlier, on April 2, 2014, when it issued the Hearing 
Order for the Project which included the List of Issues, the NEB excluded 
from the List of Issues the environmental effects associated with upstream 
activities and development of the oil sands, including GHG emissions.  
The City of Vancouver at that time applied for an order expanding the List 
to include those issues.    
The NEB panel in a ruling on July 23, 2014 (NEB Ruling 25) re-
jected the application by the City of Vancouver to expand the List of Is-
sues, which would have permitted intervenors to call expert evidence 
about emissions and climate change.14  The substance of the ruling was 
that environmental impacts of that kind are not “directly related” to the 
 
12.  Id. (emphasis added). 
13.  NEB Report on Trans Mountain Expansion Project, OH-001-2014, 





14. Ruling No. 25 on Trans Mountain Expansion Project, OH-001-2014, 














Project: “The Project does not include upstream production and is not de-
pendent on any particular upstream development and, therefore, any link 
to environmental changes caused by such upstream production is indirect 
and not necessarily incidental to Project approval.”15 
On October 16, 2014, the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) dis-
missed an application by the City of Vancouver for leave to appeal NEB 
Ruling 25.16  Other parties also challenged the exclusion of climate evi-
dence.  All lawful avenues to raise questions concerning the emissions and 
climate implications of the proposed Trans Mountain expansion project by 
participating in the NEB inquiry process were effectively closed by reason 
of the above rulings and orders.  When the NEB recommended approval 
of the project on May 19, 2016, the report did not discuss emissions or 
climate. 
 
B. Trans Mountain Upstream Emissions Report (November 25, 2016) 
 
The second review process was the so-called “upstream emis-
sions assessment” for the Trans Mountain project, officially called the 
“Review of Related Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates for the Trans 
Mountain Expansion Project.”17  The purpose of the assessment was 
briefly described in a January 2016 announcement: “Assess the upstream 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with this project and make this in-
formation public.”18  On March 19, 2016, the government quietly pub-
lished details of the emissions assessment procedure in the Canada Ga-
zette explaining the new procedure.19 
The final upstream emissions report, publicly released on Novem-
ber 25, 2016, ultimately acknowledged that the annual level of oil sands 
emissions will rise from 90 Mt in 2020 to 116 Mt by 2030, and accepted 
that the expanded capacity of the Trans Mountain project will account for 
 
15.  Id. (emphasis added). 
16.  Order Dismissing City of Vancouver Leave to Appeal Ruling No. 25, 
(F.C.A. Oct. 16, 2014) (No. 14-A-55). 
17.  Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC – Trans Mountain Expansion Project 
Review of Related Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates, ENV’T & CLI-
MATE CHANGE CAN. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://iaac-aeic.gc.ca/050/docu-
ments/p80061/116524E.pdf. 
18.  Interim Measures for Pipeline Reviews, GOV’T OF CAN. (Jan. 27, 
2016), https://www.canada.ca/en/natural-resources-canada/news/2016/01/interim-
measures-for-pipeline-reviews.html. 
19.  Dep’t of Env’t & Climate Change, Estimating Upstream GHG Emis-











13 Mt to 15 Mt of that growth.  Yet the report stated, in its conclusions, 
that assuming long-term oil prices reach US$80 or higher in the post-2020 
period, any “incremental GHG emissions” attributed to the pipeline ex-
pansion will be “minimal.”  That optimistic conclusion was incorporated 
into the language of the formal Order in Council dated November 29, 
2016, which authorized the construction of the Trans Mountain project.  
The Order recited a brief summary of the upstream assessment report re-
garding the impact of the pipeline on Canada’s total emissions: “The as-
sessment concluded that incremental emissions are unlikely to be expected 
as oil production is expected to grow by more than the capacity of the 
expanded line regardless of whether the pipeline is built.”20    
This appeared to be an assurance that the Trans Mountain pipeline 
expansion would not cause higher emissions.  That seemingly contradic-
tory finding is explained by the methodology that governed the upstream 
emissions assessment.  The methodology was prescribed in the five-page 
notice published in the Canada Gazette on March 19, 2016: 
  
The assessment of upstream GHG’s will consist of two 
parts: (A) a quantitative estimation of the GHG emissions 
released as a result of upstream production associated 
with the project, and (B) a discussion of the project’s po-
tential impact on Canadian and global GHG emissions.21 
 
The document described the procedure as “the methodology.”  
The first step was to calculate the “estimated throughput” (i.e., how much 
diluted bitumen would be carried by the project).  Part A of the assessment 
would calculate the total GHG emissions “associated with the project”—
i.e., the volume of emissions generated every year in the course of produc-
ing the amount of bitumen that could be transported to markets by the new 
pipeline, if it were built.  Part B of the assessment promised to provide 
Canadians with “a discussion of the project’s potential impact on Canadian 
and global emissions.”  But the “methodology” designed for Part B of the 
assessment was formulated in a particular way, which fatally limited the 
 
20.  Explanatory Note, Order in Council P.C. 2016-1069, NAT. ENERGY 
BD. (Nov. 29, 2016), http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2016/2016-12-10/html/sup1-
eng.html (emphasis added). 
21.  Dep’t of Env’t & Climate Change, Estimating upstream GHG emis-
sions, 150 CAN. GAZETTE 786, 787 (Mar. 19, 2016), http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-










scope of the inquiry: “The second part of the analysis discusses the condi-
tions under which the Canadian upstream emissions estimated in Part A 
could be expected to occur even if the project were not built.”22  
The above wording meant that in looking at the impact of “the 
Project,” the assessment must ask this question: Will future increase in oil 
sands production (and therefore the future increase of emissions) made 
possible by the additional transport capacity of this project occur even if 
the pipeline is not built?  Clear guidance is given on what steps the assess-
ment must follow to answer that question: “The second step involves eval-
uating the technical and economic potential for alternate modes of trans-
portation to be used in the absence of the proposed project.”23 
Rail transport is of course the alternative.  The assessment is there-
fore required to evaluate whether rail transport would be an economically 
viable method to transport the increased bitumen production to market and 
must look at the “economic and technical potential” of the alternate mode 
of transport.  Rail transport is more expensive than pipelines (about US$10 
more per barrel, according to the assessment).  The crucial question was 
whether long-term oil prices will be high enough to cover the extra cost of 
rail “in the absence of the proposed project.”  The Trans Mountain report 
accepted evidence that oil prices at about $80 per barrel or higher would 
make rail transport viable.  
The March 18, 2016 notice stipulated how the assessment 
should proceed: 
 
As an example, when considering whether Canadian 
GHG emissions would increase as a result of a crude oil 
pipeline project, the primary factor will be the potential 
increase in Canadian upstream oil production that would 
be expected to occur if the [pipeline] were not built.24   
 
Therefore, if rail transport is an economically viable alternative, 
then the assessment was obliged to decide that the increased production 
that will be carried in the proposed pipeline would be produced anyway, 
even if the pipeline were not built.  In that case, the new pipeline would 
not make emissions any worse—because the increased production would 
still occur even if the new pipeline were not approved.  In that case, the 
pipeline will not “cause” any “incremental” emissions, according to the 
terminology. 
 
22.  Id. at 789 (emphasis added).  
23.  Id. (emphasis added). 










Of course, in reality, emissions will increase if production grows.  
The assessment found that the amount of increased bitumen production 
carried by expanded pipeline capacity would account for an additional 13 
Mt to 15 Mt of greenhouse gas emissions per year (about a 20% increase 
of the industry’s total emissions, based on the 2015 level)—a significant 
increase in our total emissions.  
Guided by the prescribed methodology, the Trans Mountain as-
sessment was able to show that “incremental” emissions caused by the 
pipeline expansion will be “minimal.”25  Evidence was available to estab-
lish that long-term oil prices will increase to about US$78 per barrel by 
2020 and will continue to rise gradually to US$102 by 2040.  The assess-
ment concluded the project would cause only minimal “incremental” 
emissions, because the same amount of production increase (and the same 
emissions growth) would occur if the pipeline were not built—because rail 
transport would be viable as an alternate form of transport.   
In truth, the accumulating concentration of CO2 emissions in the 
atmosphere is the problem we are trying to solve.  In light of that problem, 
the distinction between pipelines and rail transport is meaningless.  If we 
increase production by 590,000 barrels per day (the increased capacity 
added by the Trans Mountain expansion), Canada’s total emissions will 
increase by 13 Mt to 15 Mt—whether the increased output is shipped by 
pipeline or shipped by rail.    
The upstream emissions assessment was a closed process.  It was 
not a public inquiry.  There were no hearings.  There was no media access.  
The government and the pipeline company controlled the flow of infor-
mation. Incredibly, the procedure required that only “publicly available 
data provided by the proponent will be used.”  The “proponent” was the 
pipeline company.  No representatives of the public could participate or 
demand the right to call evidence.  
In this hugely consequential decision, everything depended on the 
integrity of the second process, the upstream emission assessment.  A 
proper inquiry must be public, because that is our guarantee that the evi-
dence will not be pre-selected or cherry-picked.  The integrity of the pro-
cess must be protected by the basic principles of judicial independence, so 
we can be confident that decision makers are not being influenced by pres-
sures, discussions, or other sources of information that have not been 
 
25.  Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC—Trans Mountain Expansion Project 
Review of Related Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates, ENV’T & CLI-











tested in the hearing room, in public view.  The assessment failed to meet 
any of these basic standards, quietly deciding behind closed doors what 
evidence it would look at, and what lines of inquiry it would ignore.  
 
C. The Ministerial Panel on the Trans Mountain Pipeline                 
(November 1, 2016) 
 
There was a third process.  The Ministerial Panel was an unusual 
kind of public consultation, appointed by the Federal Minister of Natural 
Resources in May 2016.  It did not have any powers to call evidence, or to 
make findings, or draw conclusions.  The Ministerial Panel’s only mandate 
was to listen to members of the public—including some of Canada’s lead-
ing experts on emissions who volunteered to make submissions.  People 
were permitted to attend a series of public meetings in Alberta and British 
Columbia to express their concerns about what issues and evidence had 
been overlooked, or inadequately dealt with, during the previous two pro-
cesses.   
Where it was faced with conflicting information or contradictory 
opinions, the panel was not permitted to adjudicate which view should be 
accepted.  All it could do was report the conflicting information to the 
Minister in Ottawa.  After two months of public meetings, the panel re-
leased its report on November 1, 2016. 
One of the most significant divergences the Ministerial Panel 
identified in its report was a fundamental difference between two visions 
about the future trend of global oil demand.  The panel summarized the 
views of presenters in Alberta (people who attended and made submis-
sions to the panel were called “presenters”; this was not a judicial hearing).  
The panel recounts the submissions during the hearings in Alberta about 
the future of global oil demand: 
 
There was no campaign of denial.  At the same time, pre-
senters pointed to domestic and international energy in-
dustry projections that show a rising need for hydrocar-
bon-based sources during a period of transition to 
renewable forms of energy.  The question, they said, is 
not whether Canada, and the world, should be shifting to 
clean energy; rather, it’s a matter of how quickly that con-
version can occur.  The presenters who appeared before 
us in Calgary suggested a transitional timeline in the order 
of 30 to 50 years.  And if you accept that timeline as real-
istic, they said that Canada should be prepared in the 










Canada should not restrain its energy production at the 
expense of the country’s economic potential or living 
standard . . . .26  
 
In direct contradiction to that view, the report quotes several leading cli-
mate researchers who, in their submissions to the panel, explained the con-
sequences of allowing Canadian oil and gas production to grow as pres-
ently planned.  They explained that our present energy resource expansion 
plans are incompatible with our overriding commitment to keep warming 
below 2°C.  The panel quotes political scientist Kathryn Harrison, who has 
researched and published widely on energy policy and the efficacy of Can-
ada’s emissions reduction efforts: “To embrace the economic viability of 
this project is to self-consciously make an economic bet on a world of 
catastrophic climate change that the Government of Canada itself explic-
itly committed to avoid.”27  Harrison’s point is that the future economic 
viability of the Trans Mountain project depends on the world experiencing 
continued growth of global oil demand over the next 25 years to 2040.  
Canada’s oil sands industry is a high-cost producer, compared to other 
major suppliers of conventional crude oil around the world.  The industry 
requires relatively high long-term oil prices to cover its comparatively 
high production costs.  The NEB’s forecast expansion of oil sands produc-
tion from 2.3 million barrels per day (“bpd”) in 2014 to 4.3 million bpd in 
2040—which is the economic rationale for the Trans Mountain project—
is based on the assumption that we will see two or three more decades of 
increasing global oil consumption.  
But continued growth of global oil consumption for 25 more years 
is incompatible with keeping warming within the 2°C limit. In a 2015 re-
port, Kathryn Harrison explained her analysis: 
 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has modeled na-
tional and global emissions consistent with limiting cli-
mate change to the internationally agreed target of 2C, 
which would entail peaking CO2 concentration in the at-
mosphere at 450ppm.  Underscoring the potential impacts 
of international action on Canada’s exports, this “450 
 
26.  Ministerial Panel, Report from the Ministerial Panel for the Trans 
Mountain Expansion Project, NAT. RES. CAN. 10 (Nov. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/files/pdf/16-
011_TMX%20Full%20Report-en_nov2-11-30am.pdf (emphasis added). 
27.  Id. at 32 (quoting Kathryn Harrison, Professor of Political Science 










ppm scenario” finds that global oil consumption would 
need to peak as early as 2020 and decline thereafter, with 
projected demand in 2035 13% lower than in 2011.28 
    
Harrison warned that a “transitional period” of rising oil demand for an-
other 30 years is “an economic bet on a world of catastrophic climate 
change.”29  U.B.C. climate scientist Simon Donner, in his submission to 
the Ministerial Panel, addressed the same concern.  He focused on the as-
sumption (accepted by the Trans Mountain report) that global oil produc-
tion will continue to increase up to 2040.  He specifically criticized the 
conclusion in the Trans Mountain report that even if Canada were to curb 
the expansion of its oil sands production, “investments would be made in 
other jurisdictions and global oil consumption would be materially un-
changed in the long term . . . .”30  I quote here the Ministerial Panel’s 
summary of Simon Donner’s answer: “Donner described this as typical of 
the tragedy-of-the-commons analysis in which, if everyone in the world 
decides that the impact of their contribution is irrelevant in a global con-
text, then everyone will continue to expand.”31  
If all of the world’s major oil producing countries that have large 
enough oil reserves to substantially increase their production levels during 
the next 25 years decide to do so (there are about six big producers, in-
cluding Canada, that have the capability to do that), the world will have 
no chance of keeping the increase in global temperature below the 2°C 
threshold.  
Unfortunately, the Ministerial Panel had no power to make find-
ings of fact or to draw any conclusions based on scientific evidence.  It 
had no authority to adjudicate between the views of the Alberta presenters 
(that we can safely keep increasing global oil consumption for another 30 
to 50 years) and the evidence of climate scientists (that further growth of 
global oil production must begin to decline after 2020). 
 
28.  Kathryn Harrison, Review of Destination Country Policies with Po-
tential to Impact Demand for Canadian Oil Exports, CITY OF VANCOUVER 8 (May 
2015), https://vancouver.ca/images/web/pipeline/Kathryn-Harrison-impact-of-desti-
nation-country-policies-on-oil-exports.pdf (emphasis added). 
29.  Ministerial Panel, Report from the Ministerial Panel for the Trans 
Mountain Expansion Project, NAT. RES. CAN. 32 (Nov. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/files/pdf/16-
011_TMX%20Full%20Report-en_nov2-11-30am.pdf (emphasis added) (quoting 
Kathryn Harrison, Professor of Political Science, Univ. of B.C.). 
30.  Id. at 32–33.  










The panel was not allowed to make “recommendations.”  But it 
found a way to make what were, in effect, a series of highly significant 
findings—findings that identify crucial questions that had not been an-
swered.  The panel stated: “Our role was not to propose solutions, but to 
identify important questions that, in the circumstances, remain unan-
swered.”32  
The first “high-level question” that “remains unanswered,” ac-
cording to the three panel members, is whether the growth of emissions 
that will result from building the Trans Mountain pipeline can be recon-
ciled with Canada’s climate change commitment, which includes our 2030 
emissions reduction target.  The panel states the question this way: “Can 
construction of a new Trans Mountain Pipeline be reconciled with Can-
ada’s climate change commitments?”33  The panel unanimously concluded 
that this is one of the important questions that “remain unanswered.”  The 
Ministerial Panel’s report was delivered to the government on November 
1, 2016.  Four weeks later, the cabinet announced its decision approving 
the two pipelines—without any public comment on the unanswered ques-
tion.   
The panel was correct.  The question—about whether Canada’s 
projected expansion of oil sands production to 2040 can be reconciled with 
a 2°C world—had never been answered.  The NEB inquiry refused to ac-
cept or consider any evidence about the impact of increasing oil sands 
emissions on the climate system.  The upstream emissions assessment had 
accepted without question (and without cross-examination or scrutiny) 
that Canada’s oil sands production would continue to expand up to 2040 
in accord with the NEB’s “business-as-usual” projection. 
None of these three processes offered any findings that could have 
“satisfied” the cabinet that the Trans Mountain project was “consistent” 
with our climate commitments.           
 
VI.    CONCLUSION 
 
The Order in Council had all the outer markings of a lawful order.  
But the Order was not derived from any process of inquiry that would al-
low us to trust the decision.  The Order in Council, therefore, cannot com-
pel our respect.  In answer to our application to call evidence about the 
emissions implications of the Trans Mountain expansion and climate 
change, the Crown Prosecutor told the court at our hearing that there is “no 
 
32.  Id. at 46. 










need to delve into climate change.”  The core problem is that the Federal 
Government refused to delve into climate change—and then deceived Ca-
nadians by claiming that it had done so, even incorporating that misleading 
claim into the text of the Order itself.  Canada’s political institutions have 
failed us at this horrific moment, tainting the lawful roots of this project, 
which rests on the Order in Council and the woefully inadequate review 
processes that preceded it.  Our own government cast off the prudent and 
cautious law-sanctioned rules that would have allowed us to have confi-
dence in their findings and decisions.  We are forced, in forbidding cir-
cumstances, to make our own judgments about the risks ahead.    
 
